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ABSTRACT 
Ubiquitous and pervasive applications, where the Wireless Sensor Networks are typically deployed, lead 
to the susceptibility to many kinds of security attacks. Sensors used for real time response capability also 
make it difficult to devise the resource intensive security protocols because of their limited battery, power, 
memory and processing capabilities. One of potent form of Denial of Service attacks is Wormhole attack 
that affects on the network layer. In this paper, the techniques dealing with wormhole attack are 
investigated and an approach for wormhole prevention is proposed. Our approach is based on the 
analysis of the two-hop neighbors forwarding Route Reply packet. To check the validity of the sender, a 
unique key between the individual sensor node and the base station is required to be generated by 
suitable scheme. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Deployment of Wireless Sensor Network is mainly in hostile environments like military battle 
field, habitat monitoring, nuclear power plants, target tracking, seismic monitoring, fire and 
flood detection etc. where constant monitoring and real time response are of pioneer 
requirement. Loss of normal messages can be allowed by such applications, but they cannot 
tolerate the loss of numerous packets of critical event messages [1]. This kind of need makes the 
sensor nodes an essential part of the network. Inherently, a wireless sensor network is an 
interconnection among hundreds, thousands or millions of sensor nodes. A sensor node is an 
embedded device that integrates a number of microprocessor components onto a single chip. 
Although a sensor node is capable of sensing, data processing and communication tasks, their 
limited memory capacity, limited battery power, low bandwidth and low computational power 
makesthe sensor network vulnerable to many kinds of attacks. [2]. Even unlike the wired 
networks where attackers are prevented by the physical media, the open nature of wireless 
medium makes it easy for outsider attackers to interfere and interrupt the legitimate traffic. [3] 
This leads to various security issues like key establishment, secrecy, authentication, privacy, 
secure routing etc. 
Wormhole attack is one of the Denial-of-Service attacks effective on the network layer, that can 
affect network routing, data aggregation and location based wireless security. [3] The wormhole 
attack may be launched by a single or a pair of collaborating nodes. In commonly found two 
ended wormhole, one end overhears the packets and forwards them through the tunnel to the 
other end, where the packets are replayed to local area. In case when they only forward all the 
packets without altering the content, they are helping the network to accomplish transmission 
faster. But in majority of the cases, it either drops or selectively forwards the packets, leading to 
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the network disruption. Wormhole attack does not require MAC protocol information as well as 
it is immune to cryptographic techniques. [4] This makes it very difficult to detect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Two-Ended Wormhole Link 
A number of approaches have been proposed for handling wormhole attack. Some approaches 
only detect the presence of wormhole in the network, while some approaches also focus on 
avoiding or preventing the wormhole attack. Majority of the techniques presented require 
additional hardware support, tight time synchronization, localization information or may be 
confined to specific routing algorithm. 
An approach for preventing wormhole attack has been presented in this paper. No special 
hardware or time synchronization is required for this method. Additionally, only self 
geographical location is required for the proposed key generation phase. The mechanism 
implements conditional forwarding of Route Reply packet based on the validity of the two-hop 
neighbor forwarding it. The route is selected for transmission only if each node in reverse path 
till the source node validates the two-hop sender node. 
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows: Section 2 discusses Denial of 
Service attack and gives an overview of various types and models of wormhole. Section 3 
presents a brief review of the existing techniques for wormhole attack prevention. The proposed 
approach is explained in section 4. Simulation setup is given in section 5 while simulation 
results and their analysis are discussed section 6. Finally, conclusion is drawn and possible 
future work is proposed in section 7.  
2. BACKGROUND 
Effective performance in hostile area increases the application of wireless sensor network day by 
day, but the open nature of wireless medium and especially hardware limitations of a wireless 
sensor network themselves make it vulnerable to many kinds of security attacks. Adversary, with 
a large amount of power supply, memory and processing abilities and capacity for high-power 
radio transmission, leads to various kinds of attacks to the network [10]. This makes security a 
major issue to be concentrated well in a sensor network.  
2.1.Threat Models 
Participation of attackers, the way they affect network and their capacities classify adversaries 
into various models. Depending upon whether the attacker is the part of the network itself or 
not, categorizes them into Outsider and Insider attackers. Passive attackers do not alter the 
packet data but they only interfere in normal network traffic flow, while data is updated by 
Active attackers. Mote class attackers have limited power capacity to affect some sensor nodes 
only, while more powerful devices like laptop can also be victims of Laptop class attackers. 
Many routing protocols are devised but almost none of them is designed with security as a 
goal[1]. Securing with shared symmetric keys also brings a question of distributing key, while it 
is too expensive to implement asymmetric cryptography. Even after handling all these issues if 
security is imposed, there is an attack namely, Denial of Service attack that can disturb, disrupt or 
Legitimate Nodes              Wormhole End Points 
Out-of-Band Channel 
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can stop the legitimate routing operations even without the knowledge of the encryption. This 
feature makes it very important to identify and to defend against. 
2.2. Denial of Service Attack 
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is an attempt to make a computer system (server or client) or 
some other resource unavailable to legitimate users. In general, it aims to prevent some services 
from functioning efficiently either temporarily or indefinitely.Hardware failures, environmental 
conditions, software bugs or resource exhaustion can lead to Denial of Service attacks. Various 
types of DoS attacks work at different layer and affect differently to the network, where one 
kind of DoS attack is wormhole attack. 
2.3. Wormhole Attack Model 
Wormhole attack is a network layer attack that can affect the network even without the 
knowledge of cryptographic techniques implemented. This is the reason why it is very difficult 
to detect. It is caused by one, two or more number of nodes. In most commonly type of two-
ended wormhole, one end tunnels the packets via wormhole link and the other end, on receiving 
packets, replays them to the local area. The types and models of wormhole are explained here. 
2.3.1. Types of Wormhole Attack 
Number of nodes involved in establishing wormhole and the way to establish it classifies 
wormhole into the following types. 
Wormhole using Out-of-Band Channel 
In this two-ended wormhole, a dedicated out-of-band high bandwidth channel is placed between 
end points to create a wormhole link. Fig. 2 represents this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Wormhole using out-of-band channel and encapsulation 
Wormhole using Packet Encapsulation 
Each packet is routed via the legitimate path only, when received by the wormhole end, gets 
encapsulated to prevent nodes on way from incrementing hop counts.The packet is brought into 
original form by the second end point. 
Wormhole using High Power Transmission 
This kind of wormhole approach has only one malicious node with much high transmission 
capability that attracts the packets to follow path passing from it.  
Wormhole using Packet Relay 
Like the previous approach, only one malicious node is required that replays packets between 
two far nodes and this way fake neighbors are created. 
Wormhole using Protocol Deviation 
Legitimate Nodes              Wormhole End Points 
Out-of-Band Channel Legitimate Path Used for 
Packet Encapsulation 
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The malicious node creates wormhole by forwarding packets without backing off unlike a 
legitimate node and thus, increases the possibility of wormhole path getting selected. [5] 
2.3.2. Models of Wormhole Attacks 
Packet forwarding behavior of wormhole end points as well as their tendency to hide or show 
the identities, leads to the following three kinds of models. Here, S and D are the source and 
destination respectively. Nodes M1 and M2 are malicious nodes. 
Open Wormhole 
Source and destination nodes and wormhole ends M1 and M2 are visible. Identities of nodes A 
and B, on the traversed path are kept hidden. 
Half-Open Wormhole 
Malicious node M1 near the source is visible, while second end M2 is set hidden. This leads to 
path S-M1-D for the packets sent by S for D. 
Close Wormhole 
Identities of all the intermediate nodes on path from S to D are kept hidden. This leads to a 
scenario where both source and destination feel themselves only one-hop away from each other. 
Thus fake neighbors are created. [6] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Open, Half-Open and Closed Wormhole 
3. RELATED WORK 
Location and Time based approaches 
Hu and Perrig [7] presented an approach using Packet Leashes, where in geographic leash and 
temporal leash put upper bound on location of the receiver and maximum time a packet takes to 
travel respectively. TIK protocol is proposed for defense against temporal leash, but the 
knowledge of geographic location or tight time synchronization is required. Taheri, Naderi and 
Barekatain [39] used leashes approach with modified packet transmission methodology to 
decrease calculation overhead of TIK protocol. 
In transmission time based mechanism (TTM), Tran, Hung and Lee brothers [8] proposed an 
approach where each node on path notes time of sending RREQ packet and receiving RREP 
packet. Here, also time consideration is the main factor. Singh and Vaisla [28] modified this 
approach by removing the sender and receiver from maintaining request and reply packet 
timing.  
Hu and Evans [9] proposed a location based approach, where directional antenna is used to 
check the validity of neighbor. Considering the direction from which the response of HELLO 
message comes and using verifiers, the neighbors are authenticated. The approach can detect 
insider attack also by establishing authentication with pair wise secret keys, but hardware 
S M A B M D 
Close Wormhole           Half-Open Wormhole               Open Wormhole 
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support is required here. Additionally, only types of wormholes with fake neighbors can be 
detected with this methodology. 
Khalil, Bagchi and Shroff [5] proposed a lightweight countermeasure (LITEWORP) for 
wormhole attack detection using guard nodes. After detecting wormhole, LITEWORP leaves 
network in that open mode only, causing possibility of more disruption. To overcome this, they 
proposed another protocol MOBIWORP [10], which removes malicious nodes from the network 
using central authority either locally or globally. 
Chen, Lou, Sun and Wang [16] presented a secure localization approach that can detect simplex 
and duplex wormhole attacks. They extended this algorithm [12] to make it effective for 
dissimilar transmission range of sensor nodes also, but still multiple wormholes cannot be 
detected by this. 
Nait-Abdesselam, Bensaou and Taleb [13] proposed detection and avoidance method that 
focuses on the load carrying by various routes. When a route is loaded heavily, it may be 
because of packet congestion etc., so it may signal alarm even when wormhole is not present. 
Khurana and Gupta [14][15] proposed an approach based on the travelled distance and 
maximum transmission range of sensor nodes. SEEEP [14] was limited to the nodes with same 
transmission range that has been extended as FEEPVR [15] to support dissimilar ranges also.  
Jakob Eriksson, Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy, MichalisFaloutsos [16] presented TrueLink concept 
that has rendezvoused and authentication phases for wormhole detection. The former phase 
requires tight time synchronization, while the later works on shared secret keys for signing 
messages. 
Connectivity and Neighborhood based approaches 
Hayajneh, Krishnamurthy and Tipper [17] presented SECUreNeighborhooD (SECUND) 
protocol that can detect multi-ended wormhole. No need of specialized hardware, knowledge 
about the node locations and no requirement of clock synchronization are positive points of this 
method, but it can work only if the presence of wormhole increases fake neighbors by 
considerable amount. 
Dimitriou and Giannetsos [18] derived an algorithm for wormhole detection based on 
connectivity information. The algorithm runs local path existence test when it detects new 
nodes. 
Gupta, Kar and Dharmaraja [25] presented an approach where the presence of wormhole is 
found by the destination by counting hop difference between the neighbors of one hop away 
nodes. Special kind of Haund Packets is used for this purpose that introduces some processing 
delay also. 
Vani and Rao [26] proposed an approach WARRDP (Wormhole-Avoidance Route Reply 
decision packet)for wormhole detection and removal using the combined approach of Hop 
count, Anomaly based and Neighbor list methods. 
Graphical and Topological Information based approaches 
Wang and Bhargava [19] presented a centralized approach MDS-VOW (Multi-Dimensional 
Scaling- Visualization Of Wormhole) with central controller. Here no hardware support is 
required, but it is less effective for sparse network. 
A graph theoretic approach was presented by R. Poorvendram and Lazos [20] that provides 
necessary and sufficient conditions to detect and defend against wormhole attack. Specialized 
guard nodes, with high radio range, are the requirements of this methodology. 
Choi, Kim, Lee and Jung [21] proposed a Wormhole Attack Prevention (WAP) algorithm based 
on DSR protocol. The algorithm works well for hidden attacks, but for the exposed attacks, it is 
difficult to detect by this approach. 
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Azer, Kassas and Soudani [22] proposed a detection and prevention approach based on 
Diffusion of Innovations that works fine except the end to end delivery time is increased 
considerably. 
Routing Algorithm Specific approaches 
Poornima, Bindu and Munwar [23] proposed a scheme based on geographic routing that, with 
Reverse Routing Scheme (RRS) and Authentication of Nodes Scheme (ANS), detects the 
presence of wormhole. It mainly works for BSR protocol and the value of witness threshold is 
too critical for the success of this approach.  
Attir, Abdesselam, Brahim, Bensaou, Ben-Othman [24] proposed an approach using 
neighborhood detection and using W-Delay and appending additional information to the HELLO 
packet, detects wormhole. This method works, but it is limited to OLSR protocol only. 
4. PROPOSED APPROACH 
An approach for wormhole prevention is presented here where each node forwarding Route 
Reply RREP packet checks the validity of the two-hop neighbor node forwarding that packet. 
To accomplish the presented technique, a unique key derived based on all the two-hop 
neighbors is provided to each sensor node in the initial phase. 
4.1.Key Generation Phase 
This phase is carried out when a sensor network is established or an external node wishes to be a 
part of the network. The phase starts with execution of TinyPK [28] protocol to include each 
sensor node in the existing network. 
The distribution of unique ID and Key value can be employed as explain below. 
Key Distribution 
LEAP [29] protocol proposes a technique to establish an individual key for each node shared 
with the base station. In that, a unique ID u is assumed to be assigned to each sensor node. By 
applying some pseudo random function f to the unique ID with the master key Km, a unique main 
keyKmu is generated as 
( , )m u mK f K u=  
Here, the master key is common and available only to the controller. The generated key is pre-
loaded into each node prior to its deployment. 
To make this protocol applicable for the proposed approach, separate master keys for individual 
node is required to be used and the function f is designed to apply to all two-hop neighbor IDs in 
place of unique ID u. Additionally, information regarding the master key value Km, generated 
key Kmu and applied function f are also provided to each sensor node for further use. 
4.2.Wormhole Prevention Phase 
In commonly used Dynamic Routing Algorithms, Route Request (RREQ) packet is broadcasted 
by the source node. All nodes receiving this packet broadcast it further until it reaches to the 
destination. As shown in the Fig. 4, nodes A and O are source and destination nodes 
respectively. Node A is broadcasting RREQ packet. On receiving this packet, node O forwards 
Route Reply (RREP) packet for the path from which it obtains the first RREQ packet. 
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Let use consider a case where a wormhole link is present between node C and node L. When 
RREQ is received by node C, it will be diverted to node L directly via the established out-of-
band wormhole link. In this case, RREP packet follows the path shown in fig 5. 
For wormhole prevention, each node is supposed to store the detail of each and every RREP 
packet it forwards. On receiving RREP, its validity is tested through a check phase which is 
started with broadcasting of Probe message and its corresponding Probe_Ack_Tag value. For 
various possible cases the sequence is explained further. 
4.2.1. Case with No Wormhole 
Let us for the above scenario, shown in fig. 4, no wormhole is present. The steps taken by the 
node on reception of RREP packet are explained here. If a node receives RREP from the 
destination,then forwards the packet else starts the following steps. The steps are explained with 
reference to node I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Transmission of 
RREQ and RREP Messages 
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Figure 5. Transmission of RREP 
Message via Wormhole Link 
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Figure 6. Transmission of 
Probe Message by Node I 
Figure 7. Transmission of 
Probe_Ack Message to Node I 
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1. Node I sends Probe message to all its two-hop neighbors i.e. to nodes C, E, G, K and O, 
where  source and destination IDs A and O respectivelyare also specified as in Fig. 6 
2. Each of the node checks whether it has sent or forwarded RREP for given source-
destination combination and responds with Probe_Ack message accordingly 
3. If has forwarded the corresponding RREP packet, then it attaches Probe_Ack_tag 1 with 
the Probe_Ack message else attaches 0 and sends back to node I 
4. Let us assume that node I receives Probe_Ack messages as : 
  C with 0, E with 0, G with 0, K with 0 and O with 1 
5. Exactly one tag is 1 so the case is considered to be a valid case 
6. Derived Local Key LK using node IDs for C,E,G,K and O and if it matches with its own 
Kmu, then forwards RREP message, else alarms “Illegal Case” 
7. In general, for node N, 
If, 2 h nN
1
1i
i
P r o b e _ A c k _ T a g
=
=∑
 
Where, N2hn = Two-hop Neighbors of Node N 
Then, calculate  
2( ) ( , 1 )i h nL K N f I D i N= ≤ ≤
 If Kmu(N) = LK(N), the RREP packet had arrived from a valid node and will be 
forwarded,else
alarms “Illegal Case” 
Same Procedure is repeated by nodes F, C, B and A 
4.2.2. Case with Wormhole 
Let us assume a wormhole link is present between nodes C and L, so RREP is forwarded from 
node L to node C directly as shown in Fig. 5. For this, RREP gets forwarded till node B. Then 
node B sends Probe message. The various possible cases how the legitimate and fake neighbors 
may respond to the Probe message are discussed further. 
4.2.2.1. Possibility 1 : Hidden Passive Wormhole Attack 
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Figure 8 Transmission of Probe 
Message by Node B 
 
Figure 9. Transmission of 
Probe_Ack Message to Node B 
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As Shown in Fig. 9, assume that node B receives Probe_Ack messages as :D with 0, F with 0 
and H with 0. Ideally, the situation is impossible where none of the two-hop neighbor node has 
forwarded the RREP packet. Identifying such results, node B alarms the “Illegal Case”. 
Let us for node N, 
If, 2 h nN
1
0i
i
P r o b e _ A c k _ T a g
=
=∑
 
then, the case is invalid case and RREP is stopped getting forwarded. 
4.2.2.2.  Possibility 2 : Exposed Passive Wormhole Attack 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let us consider a case where wormhole end L keeps its identity exposed and node B receives 
Probe_Ack messages as :D with 0, F with 0, H with 0 and L with 1. Here, when LK is derived 
considering the IDs of nodes D, F, H and L, its value does not match with the Kmu value of node 
B as node L is not the legitimate two-hop neighbor and has not considered while deriving Kmu. 
In general, for node N, 
If,       
2 h nN
1
1i
i
P r o b e _ A c k _ T a g
=
=∑
 then, calculate  
 
2( ) ( , 1 )i h nL K N f I D i N= ≤ ≤
 Here,Kmu(N) <> LK(N), as the RREP packet has arrived from a malicious node pretending as a 
two-hop neighbor  node. Accordingly, this case is also alarmed as an “Illegal Case”.
 
4.2.2.3. Possibility 3 : Hidden Active Wormhole Attack 
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Figure 10. Transmission of 
Probe Message by Node B 
 
Figure 11. Transmission of 
Probe_Ack Message to Node B 
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A case with active attack can be considered where node F sends Probe_Ack_Tag with 0 value, 
but it is changed to 1 by the malicious node C. In such case the receivedProbe_Ack messages 
are:  D with 0, F with 1 and H with 0.  
This kind of result finds matching between the derived LK value and Kmu value and so 
validates the two-hop neighbor sender and forwards the RREP packet. In reality, the case is an 
illegal case as maliciously the tag value sent by one of the legitimate node is altered on way. 
However, if the sent Probe_Ack message by node F reaches to node B for more than once via 
different routes, then node B received dissimilar tag values for the node F. Such situation raises 
a question on the validity of received tag values and “Illegal Case” is alarmed. 
Let, Probe_Ack_Tagij = Tag Message Received by node N from node j, sent by node i 
Then, for the defined case, if we take N=B, 
Probe_Ack_TagFC= 1 and Probe_Ack_TagFE= 0, where ideally, both must be equal. 
i.e. if for a node N, if 
h nN 1
1
1i j
i
P r o b e _ A c k _ T a g ≤
=
∑  
then, for N1hn = One-Hop Neighbor of node N, the tag message is likely to be altered on way. 
Ifj=1, it meansthat there is only one common one-hop neighbor between node N and its two-hop 
neighbor I ,then we may not be able to find that the Probe_Ack_Tagvaluehas been changed on 
way. 
5. SIMULATION SETUP 
Simulations are performed in ns-2 network simulator [30] for 30 nodes, where parameters are 
given in Table 1.  Zero background traffic and nodes with zero mobility are assumed here. 
Table 1: Simulation Parameters 
 
Parameters Values  Parameters Values 
Examined Protocol AODV  Transmission range 250 m 
Simulation time 0.3 units  Traffic type CBR(UDP) 
Simulation area 600 × 600  Number of wormholes 3 
Figure 12. Transmission of 
Probe Message by Node B 
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Figure 13. Transmission of 
Probe_Ack Message to Node B 
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6 . RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The proposed solution allows sensor nodes to forward RREP packet provided some conditions 
are met. This gets accomplished by spending additional time and energy. An upper limit can 
also be placed on waiting time for Probe_Ack messages that is also decided using simulation. 
6.1. RREP Transmission Time and Energy Consumption 
Before forwarding the RREP packet, each node broadcasts Probe message and waits for 
Probe_Ack message from the two-hop neighbor nodes. Based on the decision taken from the 
received tag values, decision for forwarding RREP is taken. These additional steps add total 
transmission time in receiving the RREP packet as well as the energy consumed by the nodes. 
The graphs shown in fig. 14 and fig. 15compare the transmission time taken and energy 
consumed with and without the implementation of the proposed prevention approach 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure 14. Transmission Time Taken in RREP Packet 
 
 
Figure 15. Node Energy Consumption during RREP Packet Transmission 
 
 
 
 
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.3, No.5, Sep 2011 
96 
 
 
 
6.2. Time Taken in Collecting Probe_AckMessages 
 
Figure 16. Time Consumption in Collecting Probe_Ack 
The graph in fig. 16plots time taken in receiving the Probe_Ack message. It shows that after a 
node broadcasts Probe message, within maximum1 time unit, it receives all of the Probe_Ack 
messages, so that can be taken as the maximum time a node can wait for checking the validity 
of RREP packet. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE SCOPE 
The approach proposed here makes RREP packet forwarding conditional. By checking the 
validity of the two-hop neighbor node that has forwarded the packet, a node lets it to move 
further towards the source. Wormhole end is detected when the identity of the two-hop neighbor 
is found illegal. Authenticity checking of such two-hop neighbors is carried out using a 
preloaded secret key. By comparing the memory requirement for various numbers of neighbors, 
it can be concluded that by spending more on setup cost, higher scalability can be achieved. The 
proposed scheme focuses on the type of wormhole with out-of-band channel. It can be extended 
to detect other types of wormhole attacks also. 
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